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Abstract 
 
This article examines the relations between the European Parliament (EP) 
and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the EU’s legislative process.  It 
focuses specifically on legislative trilogues, an informal institution bringing 
together the representatives of the EP, Council, and Commission in a 
secluded setting to conclude legislative agreements. Trilogues have 
become the modus operandi and an absolutely pivotal part of the EU 
lawmaking process: they are where the deals are made. While secluded 
decision-making offers plenty of opportunities for EU institutions to 
depoliticize lawmaking, we argue that trilogues have become politicized, 
partly from the relationship between the European Parliament and civil 
society organisations. We flesh out this argument on the basis of insights 
from the politicization and the historical institutionalist literatures, 
advance two ideal types of trilogue politics, and explore these types on 
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the basis of a preliminary examination of a comprehensive interview 
material.  
Introduction 
‘Trilogues’ are the European Union’s (EU) word for an in-camera, three- 
way negotiation between the main legislative institutions, the European 
Parliament (EP), Council of Ministers, and Commission, aimed at reaching 
legislative agreements.  They have no references in the EU treaties, but a 
substantial majority of EU legislation go to trilogues (Brandsma, 2015), 
mostly resulting in inter-institutional first reading (or early-second) 
agreement (European Parliament, 2017). While this form of policy-making 
has facilitated EU lawmaking, it potentially achieves this by de-politicising 
issues, given the secluded setting, the premium on bargaining, and the 
importance of technical negotiations (Stie, 2012). 
Even so, trilogues have been the object of a growing public debate, 
fuelled in particular by discontentment in the EP and negative press 
coverage (EU Observer, 2014; International New York Times, 2014), and 
leading to the involvement of the European Ombudsman and the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU). The European Ombudsman and the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) have now made it clear that trilogues are a 
pivotal part of the lawmaking process of the EU--it is ‘where deals are 
made’--subject to the same transparency requirements that the other 
phases of the EU lawmaking process. Thus, willy nilly, trilogues have 
entered a new phase of their institutional life cycle, characterized by the 
end of the permissive consensus and the emergence of restraining 
dissensus (to paraphrase Hooghe and Marks 2009).   
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In this article, we examine how trilogues have become a politicized 
lawmaking institution. Our premise is that the contemporary debate on 
the transparency of trilogues represents the tip of the iceberg of a more 
gradual process of politicization, initiated from within. Our working 
hypothesis is that the European Parliament is the main driver of this 
process, politicizing an otherwise closed and rather technical set of 
negotiations by relying on a broad range of civil society organizations 
(CSO), although especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs).2 
Given the early state of research on trilogues, our focus is on sketching 
out a theoretical argument through which to grasp the politicization of 
trilogues, and to outline very preliminary evidence.  
Theoretically, we develop a perspective combining insights from 
recent works on the politicization of European integration and from 
historical institutionalism. While the politicization literature is rapidly 
becoming the main frame of reference on this topic in EU affairs and can 
help us conceptualize politicization as an EU phenomenon, we need to 
supplement its overriding focus on the public sphere with an account of 
politicization from within (institutions). Historical institutionalism is well-
suited to do this because it is based on an understanding of institutions as 
instantiations of power and the result of political compromises, and 
because it offers a complementary understanding of change as an 
endogenous process.  
Empirically, the difficulty of studying trilogues is to access data, 
given the closed and rather informal character of this phenomenon. 
                                       
2 In this paper, we draw a distinction between two types of CSOs: producer 
associations and NGOs.   
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Barring the option of participant observation, to which we did not have 
access, alternatives are to rely on content analysis of legislation ( Laloux 
and Delreux, 2018) or on interviews with EU practitioners. We chose the 
latter research strategy given our interest in probing the relationship 
between the EP and CSOs. The data upon which we draw in this study are 
part of a broader dataset of more than 87 interviews with EU 
practitioners, collected for the purpose of a larger research project 
focusing on information flows between EU lawmakers and CSOs in 
trilogues. The interviewees are both trilogue ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, 
where insiders are those who participated in trilogues, or are involved in 
institutional preparation for trilogues, whereas outsiders are those who 
have no official access to the trilogue process.  
In this paper, we focus on a sub-set of interviews (interviews with 
CSOs) and provide insights from an exploratory foray into the empirical 
material. These interviews help us flesh out ideal types of relationships 
between the EP and CSOs, arrived at through a distillation and 
extrapolations of the findings of the EU lobbying literature.    
  
The case for studying trilogue politicization 
The role of CSOs in the EU political system is well-documented. A range of 
CSOs, comprising producer organisations and NGOs: supply EU 
institutions with technical (Warleigh, 2000) and political information; act 
as political supporters and messengers where there is common cause; 
aggregate and articulate interests (Albareda and Braun, 2019); represent 
concentrated interest constituencies or act as a proxy for a diffuse and 
often disengaged civil society (Klüver, 2013; Kohler Koch and Quittkat, 
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2013; Greenwood, 2017).  Their role is particularly important in EU policy-
making because much EU legislation is regulatory in nature, requiring 
extensive technical information, placing a premium on those able to 
supply it in a convenient format.  In the EU, it has long been recognised 
that access to every-day policy-making is dependent upon the supply of 
information (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Klüver et al, 2015; Chalmers, 
2019). Strikingly, we know very little about the role of CSOs in trilogues. 
The bulk of the literature has focused on the other parts of the EU policy 
cycle: agenda-setting; policy formulation; and implementation. By 
contrast, the decision-making phase remains understudied, and the 
trilogue phase is a blind spot in the research agenda.  
Yet, there is no reason why the flows of information between EU 
lawmakers and organized interests should stop during the highly pivotal 
trilogue phase. Trilogues typically last for a six-month period and involve 
an average of three ‘political’ level inter-institutional meetings (Brandsma, 
2015, 2018), during which time a range of lobbyists seek information 
about the progress of discussions, and, where possible, to influence the 
detail of proposals which challenge their position. A notable exception is 
the case study by Andlovic and Lehmann (2014). In this study of aviation 
emissions trading, the authors provide evidence of industry group 
lobbying of the EP, (‘individual MEPs from certain member states, 
supposedly most affected by the implementation of the directive’), 
resulting in  and that, in turn, ‘these MEPs, having detailed knowledge of 
the directive, were instrumental in the last stages of the trilogues’ 
(Andlovic and Lehman, 2014, 813; our emphasis). Other studies have 
likewise suggested that trilogues tend to privilege producer interests at 
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the expense of other types of interests (Burns at al, 2013; Dionigi and 
Koop, 2017).  But we know remarkably little about how civil society 
organizations connect with the trilogue process, and whether systematic 
biases are built into trilogues.   
It is thus time we addressed this lacuna more systematically. We 
propose to do so by developing a framework of understanding combining 
insights from the EU-related politicization literature and from the more 
general comparative politics literature on historical institutionalism.  
 
Trilogue politicization: A historical institutionalist perspective 
There has been a surge in academic interest in the politicization of 
European integration. In 2009, Hooghe and Marks argued that European 
integration had entered a new phase at the turn of the 1990s, as a result 
of a deepening of the integration process (i.e., the establishment of the 
European Union in the Treaty of Maastricht). ‘Permissive consensus’ was 
paving the way to ‘restraining dissensus’ as European integration became 
a more salient issue in domestic politics and the object of growing 
partisan controversies (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The crises of the 
2010s, the rise of Euroskepticism, and the Brexit referendum have shown 
that European integration is no longer ‘for elites only’ (Baglioni and 
Hurrelmann 2016). Broader European publics mobilize on EU issues in 
ways that can have important consequences.  
From the rapidly growing literature on politicization, two main 
insights are relevant here. The first concerns the definition of politicization 
as an observable phenomenon comprising three main dimensions: ‘(a) the 
growing salience of European governance, (…) 2) a polarisation of opinion, 
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and 3) an expansion of actors and audiences engaged in monitoring EU 
affairs’ (De Wilde et al. 2016). The second concerns the extraordinary 
differentiated character of politicization. Politicization takes many shapes 
and forms, it has many objects, and it is driven by a range of factors 
rather than, as originally assumed, the universal manifestation of the 
deepening of European integration and transfer of authority to the EU (De 
Wilde and Zürn 2012). Accounts of politicization must therefore start with 
a careful specification of the phenomenon under study, not least the arena 
in which it is observed. Baglioni and Hurrelmann (2016, 106), for 
example, propose a simple distinction between three arenas of 
politicization: a citizen arena, where ‘laypeople engage in politics’; an 
intermediary arena, where we find participants with a professional interest 
in politics (political parties, interest groups, medias); and an institutional 
arena, which is at ‘the core’ of the political system and is populated by 
politicians from, e.g., the EP and national parliaments.  
Drawing on this first stand of scholarship, we can specify the 
conceptual underpinnings of our research question as follows. 
Paraphrasing de Wilde and his colleagues, by politicization of trilogues, we 
mean the process by which actors in the trilogue negotiations highlight 
the salience of individual issues, create controversies, or expand the 
range of actors and audiences engaged in monitoring EU affairs. Our 
inquiry is located squarely within the institutional arena, in fact at the 
heart of the machine-room of EU lawmaking where deals are made, and 
where we can expect EU institutions to revert to depoliticization 
strategies. Indeed we know that ‘when a policy decision point approaches, 
but clashes between rival advocacy coalitions cause impasse, the EU’s 
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natural propensity is to depoliticize issues and “push” them back to the 
sub-systematic level [of expert committees and professional networks] for 
quiet resolution’ (Peterson 2001, 309).  
While the politicization perspective helps us pinpoint the pivotal 
significance of trilogue decision-making in light of EU institutions’ 
propensity to depoliticize issues, trilogues also bring us to the outer limits 
of what this perspective can help us make sense of. Indeed, how can it 
possibly make sense to talk about issue saliency in trilogue negotiations, 
when a proper public is missing? And how can it possibly make sense to 
talk about actor and audience expansion in trilogues when these 
negotiations are closed and only involve a fixed set of institutional actors? 
In order to make sense of these questions, we must understand 
what institutions are and how intrinsic conflict is to their formation and 
functioning: in other words, we need to retrieve a few basic insights from 
historical institutionalism. According to historical institutionalism, 
institutions are more or less solidified power struggles (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010; Waylen 2014). They emerge from power struggles, and are 
nothing else than political compromises that make orderly politics 
possible. But unlike other political compromises, for example on policy 
issues, the political compromises creating institutions are more structural 
insofar as they set the parameters for a whole range of subsequent 
(policy) decisions (Moe, 2005). Besides establishing an intimate link 
between institutions and power, historical institutionalism also makes it 
possible to understand change, and therefore also politicization. The 
important insight in this respect is that change is endogenous to 
institutions, because institutions are never ‘cohesive and equilibrating’ and 
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therefore ‘power, contestation and distributional issues [must be] at the 
center’ of the analysis (Waylen 2014, 216).  
Viewing trilogues as an institution, we argue that a key conflict 
enabling this institution to emerge in the first place was a power conflict 
between Council and the EP. This conflict has been rooted in the 
redistribution of power between the EP and Council, as illustrated by the 
long-term constitutional empowerment of the EP (Rittberger and 
Schimmelfennig, 2006). In the early years of co-decision, Council soon 
learned that it could not ‘just’ ignore the EP’s legislative position by 
reintroducing its common position after failure to reach an agreement in 
conciliation (Shackleton 2000; Shackleton and Raunio, 2003). Under the 
Council’s impulse, trilogues emerged in 1994 as a means of paving the 
way for a more predictable process by building confidence between 
Council and the EP. Since then, they have been defined by the clashing 
narratives of efficiency (Council) on the one hand, and institutional and 
partisan empowerment (EP) on the other hand. Contrary to the Council 
narrative on trilogues, most MEPs today see trilogue secrecy and seclusion 
as a way to politicize--not depoliticize--EU lawmaking by bringing salient 
issues to bear at the heart of the lawmaking machine room (Roederer-
Rynning and Greenwood 2019). This narrative builds upon an EP self-
understanding as the ‘tribune of the people’, in contrast to views of the 
Council as the ‘creature of the member states’. The result of this clash is 
that trilogues are an inherently unstable, or dynamic, institution, 
containing in its very heart the seeds of politicization. Below, we sketch 
out two main potential paths ensuing from this unstable power game and 
meeting of cultures between the EP and Council in trilogues. Before we do 
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this, however, we trace how the EP has sought to bring secluded trilogues 
more into line with established standards of democratic lawmaking. 
Trilogue reform in the EP shows that, while the EP is a force of change, it 
is also affected by its own internal dissensions.    
 
The EP and trilogue reform--internal dissension and reform push 
Figure 1 captures the picture of relief and common endeavour as a deal is 
reached in trilogue negotiations following intensive (sometimes all-night) 
negotiations, with senior figures in attendance from each of the EU 
institutions: 
 
Figure 1: Mission Accomplished: Agreement at the end of a 
trilogue meeting 
 
Source: https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1484992/europe-
agrees-32-target 
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In reality, the team negotiating for the EP with the Council of Ministers will 
have a small number of ‘red lines’, generally salient issues with public 
recognition, whilst willing to give way to the Council on technical details of 
legislative files which are difficult to make accessible for public debate 
(Greenwood and Roederer-Rynning 2014). 
Given its directly elected mandate, the EP has been the most 
sensitive of the three EU institutions to the implications of trilogues for its 
democratic legitimacy. For this reason, it has developed a series of 
measures in its Rules of Procedure (RoPs) aimed at the oversight of 
arrangements. RoPs are relatively politicised, and the result of extensive 
deliberation in the EP. Current RoP allow for four levels of oversight in 
trilogues. First, as regards trilogues, the Committee’s position on a 
legislative file is always public.  Secondly, plenary has the ability to 
overturn a Committee’s recommendation to open trilogue negotiations, a 
procedure triggered in the first instance by just one-tenth of members.  
Third, there is pluralisation of participation, in that there is a negotiating 
team for the EP comprising the Rapporteur and Shadow Rapporteurs from 
the different political parties, with the Committee Chair or Vice-Chair 
present, and political party advisors in attendance at trilogue meetings.  
These attendees ensure that the EP always has a numerical majority in 
meetings, and the reforms have collectively given political trilogues the 
semblance of formality with echoes of the now (almost) defunct 
Conciliation Committees (Figure 1): 
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Figure 2: A trilogue in process 
 
Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ordinary-legislative-
procedure/en/interinstitutional-negotiations.html 
A fourth level of oversight provided for by the RoP is that the team must 
report back to Committee on the progress of trilogue negotiations.  
These rules allow for some degree of publicity throughout the 
trilogue process, but are not without problems. One first problem is linked 
to implementation of these rules. In practice, it turns out for example that 
the report back in Commission is often perfunctory or non-existent 
(Brandsma, 2018). Another problem is that the final stage where the 
Committee presents its position to plenary is often a fait accompli, with 
plenary reluctant to intervene in what is presented as carefully crafted and 
fragile agreements made between the knowledgeable negotiating team 
and the other EU institutions, which in turn are presented as having 
limited room for manoeuvre. Finally, lack of access to key trilogue 
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documents has generated ongoing internal rumblings in the EP, which 
resulted in a keynote lawsuit against the EP, and was undoubtedly a factor 
in the Ombudsman’s decision to open an own-initiative inquiry into the 
transparency of trilogues.  
 In 2018 the ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU on the De 
Capitani case (Case T-540/15) annulled a decision of the EP to refuse to 
grant Mr Emilio De Capitani, a retired former EP administrator, full access 
to trilogue documents. The EU institutions had argued that release of the 
documents were covered by an exception in the Access to Documents 
Regulation (1049/2001) involving internal preparatory documents, 
whereas the Court found that the EU institutions’ very restrictive 
interpretation of the principles of publicity and transparency in trilogues, 
amounted to a ‘general presumption of non-disclosure’.  Moreover, the 
Court recognised the position of trilogues as a regular part of the 
legislative procedure, something the Council had disputed, and therefore 
subject to Article 12 of Regulation 10/2001 which provides for proactive 
publication in a register of documents (General Court of the European 
Union 2018; Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2019; Interview 87). 
Similarly, the Ombudsman framed a critical decision about trilogues 
(European Ombudsman, 2016) around the citizens’ right to participate in 
EU public policy making, specified in Articles 10 (3) and 11 (1-3) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), and Article 15(1) of the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), noting the pre-requisite of 
transparency to facilitate participation.  The Ombudsman, in her report, 
had asked the institutions to publish a list of documents, if not proactively 
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(the preferred option among trilogue activists) at least retrospectively, 
and to construct a joint trilogue database.   
Both the keynote De Capitani ruling and the Ombudsman’s report 
seem set to change the trilogue institutions. At the time of writing, the 
institutions have yet to change practice, but the direction of travel 
towards more transparency in trilogues is clearly founded in the decisions 
of the General Court and the Ombudsman.  
 
In the ‘shadow of public opinion’: Two types of trilogue politics 
Based on the above conceptualization of trilogue politicization and a 
cursory overview of how the EP has pushed for trilogue reform, we can 
now elaborate two ideal-types of trilogue politics. These trilogue types 
synthesize the insights of the abundant literature on EU lobbying, within 
the above delineated framework of trilogue politicization.   
  
 
The EP as a ‘responsive’ legislator 
The first type of trilogue politics corresponds to situations where the EP 
uses its participation in the trilogue process to champion diffuse interests 
and thus pluralize, or in the terminology adopted in this paper politicize, 
the deal-making phase. Given its popular mandate, the European 
Parliament (EP) has traditionally been cast as the most ‘responsive’ of all 
three policy-making institutions to NGOs which claim to articulate ‘diffuse’ 
or public interests (Judge, 1992; Pollack, 1997; Earnshaw and Judge, 
2011). The ability of social movements and NGOs to politicise issues and 
apparently turn the position of the EP is captured in the literature by case 
studies (Dür and Mateo, 2014). In turn, we know that the EP has stepped 
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up efforts at producing policy expertise, as a part of its broader strategy 
to develop institutional autonomy from the Commission and Council. It 
has also helped to stimulate the formation of NGOs (such as ‘Finance 
Watch’) where no counterweight to sectoral business interests exist, in an 
attempt to balance the supply of information. And for highly salient issues 
the EP still adopts public facing positions, reflecting its appetite for issues 
that are highly politicised.  The orientation of the EP towards CSOs and 
particular types of CSOs may nevertheless vary by committee and their 
role in a particular legislative file (Brandsma, 2015; Ripoll-Servent, 2018; 
Dionigi, 2019).  
While the literature does not deal with trilogues specifically but co-
decision in general, we can expect to find close and mutually reinforcing 
ties between the EP and NGOs in trilogues. NGOs find in the EP an ally 
ready to politicize trilogues. In return, the EP can assert itself through the 
‘noisy’ politics of NGOs. Trilogues offer the EP negotiating team a 
possibility to extract concessions from a usually more conservative Council 
by politicizing the negotiations. The EP has two main levers at its disposal: 
1) trilogues give all EP groups a seat in the negotiations, which maximizes 
the chance that a plurality of (diffuse) interests are represented and 
informed along the way; 2) the EP negotiating team can use ‘the shadow 
of public opinion’ as a source of pressure during the trilogue negotiations.  
As one EP participant put it, ‘it boils down to public pressure. If they had 
said, it’s not important, then we could have scandalized’ (interview quote, 
cited in Greenwood and Roederer-Rynning 2014, 334).  
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The EP as a ‘responsible’ legislator 
In the second type of trilogue politics, the EP has become more 
‘responsible’ with the acquisition of legislative powers, which has 
prompted it to moderate its policy claims and expectations. There are two 
main potential explanations. One is that, with increased legislative 
powers, the EP has become more ‘realistic’ in its demands because it 
becomes more attentive to the political implications of its preferences and 
more sensitive to the political realities at hand (Jacqué, 2009; Rasmussen, 
2014). Another is that legislative empowerment has made the EP much 
more dependent on fine-grained expertise. In turn, this is expected to 
give business interests greater political clout in the EP (Burson Marsteller, 
2009; Coen and Katsaitis, 2019; Dür and de Bièvre, 2007). We call this 
thesis the ‘mirror thesis’ to highlight the idea that a more powerful EP, 
according to this thesis, increasingly ‘reflects itself’ in the Council, 
adopting Council standards of appropriateness procedural norms (need to 
compromise, need to have a realistic view of the problem at hand, need to 
‘behave responsibly’) at the expense of its own policy preferences (Ripoll 
Servent 2013). What legislative empowerment does is thus to turn the EP 
as a second Council.  
While the literature focuses on co-decision in general, we can 
hypothesize that trilogues tend to place the EP in a situation of an even 
greater dependence—rather than increased bargaining power—for two 
reasons. First, the acceleration of the pace of the negotiation makes it 
critical for the EP to have access to reliable expertise. The more the 
negotiations advance, the more critical the need for swift and fine-grained 
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expertise.  Second, the fact that the chief implementation expertise is 
located within the Council (member state bureaucracies) makes the EP 
vulnerable to Council criticisms on behalf of the ‘irresponsible’ or 
‘unrealistic’ character of EP demands as the tedious process of working 
systematically through the EP amendments begins in trilogues. Council 
comes to trilogues after a long phase of internal work, during which the 
member states together with the Commission in reality fine-combed the 
legislative proposal of the Commission and the proposed Council 
amendments with a view to discussing their added value and technical 
feasibility. The EP comes to trilogues lacking not only internal expertise on 
policy implementation but also lacking the intensive Commission scrutiny 
of its proposed amendments. Trilogues are thus, a ‘reality check’ for the 
EP, literally as well as figuratively.  Consequently, this scenario implies 
that trilogues inaugurate a phase during which NGOs are structurally 
disadvantaged relative to other types of CSOs, because: (1) they will be 
perceived as unhelpful allies, politicizing negotiations at a time when 
legislators are focused on compromise and de-politicization and (2) they 
are less likely to provide the kind of swift and detailed expertise that is 
crucially needed in the final phases of the trilogue negotiations.  
  
Preliminary insights 
One of the key problems with trilogue research is the difficulty to find 
reliable and accessible data. This problem is naturally tied to the secluded 
and still informal nature of the negotiations. Ideally, we would have 
carried out participant observation, but since this option was not open, we 
settled for interviews with EU lawmakers. Long past are the days when 
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interviews were seen as a second best in qualitative research. Interviews 
can give a multiplicity of deep insights into a process, which some 
ethnographers have captured by the term ‘ethnographic interviews’ 
(Spradley, 1979; Rubow, 2003).  Drawing on this method, which we 
describe elsewhere, we undertook 87 interviews between June 2017 and 
January 2019 with the full range of CSOs (producer organisations, 
consultancies, NGOs), Permanent Representations, MEPs, their assistants, 
political party advisors in the European Parliament, and a former member 
of the EP secretariat, aimed at investigating the role of CSOs in trilogues 
(Table 1). In this article, we report preliminary insights into trilogue 
politicization by drawing on the sub-set of interviews with CSOs, and 
discuss potential links with the two ideal-type models of trilogue politics. 
Four observations strike us. 
Table 1: Interviewee breakdown here 
 
Information as currency of power--interviews highlighted the (well-
known) fact that information is the currency of power in Brussels.  One of 
the producer participants in our study, a trade union, repeated many 
times during the course of interview that ‘You can always access the 
information you need if you have an office in Brussels.’ (Interview 2). An 
office provides the means to establish and maintain regular networks, but 
also the opportunity to develop expertise as to the stage of the legislative 
process from where information can be accessed.  One MEPs Assistant 
reflected that 
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“Those with the best contacts get the most information, and 
information is power…those with the staff can find the information in 
a public database, but where information is not published then it is 
down to contacts – this is the stereotype of the EU.  There needs to 
be a one-stop shop for information where it is published.  Info needs 
to be given to everyone” (Interview 37). 
 
Written information sources--A producer association referred to 
accessing the ‘outcome of proceedings’, a kind of (lesser known) unofficial 
minutes from Council Working Parties (Interview 63). An NGO also 
referred to these, emphasising a common pool of expertise among 
professionalised civil society organisations, whether producer or NGO 
(Interview 44). The Council register was seen as the best tool: ‘I check 
every morning the Council register, and go through line-by-line the 
documents that are important for us’ (Interview 45).  Some producer 
related associations received some limited trilogue related logistical 
information (such as the announcement of a forthcoming trilogue) through 
specialised subscription sources such as Dods, One Policy Place and EU 
Issue Tracker, as well as generalised media sources, though subscription 
services do not extend to obtaining trilogue documents or political 
information (Interview 12).  Among the generalised media sources, 
Politico was seen as heralding something of a revolution since its arrival 
on the Brussels scene in 2014, though having the effect of ‘making 
PERMREPS go back into their shell’ (Interview 70). Of these written 
sources, only the Council register is publicly available--all others have to 
be accessed through one form of contacts with trilogue insiders. Trilogue 
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documents were seen as particularly difficult to obtain during the latter 
stages of a trilogue, irrespective of the type of civil society organisation, 
because of the speed at which the decision-making process moved at that 
stage (Interview 68). 
 
Information Supply and Demand--The view as to the availability of 
information for those with a Brussels office was generally shared across 
producer organizations as well as NGOs, particularly among the well-
staffed environmental NGOs, but also among many of the smaller NGOs 
(Interview 44).  Nonetheless, there was almost universal agreement 
among civil society organisations that information could be obtained by 
exchanging information or value added analysis, including counter 
arguments.  These factors generally relate to the supply of information, 
but demand for information from EU institutions was also a key factor.  A 
PERMREP from a smaller country confided that ‘there are domains where 
we don’t have great expertise, such as Audio Visual and IT, and our lack 
of expertise in some subjects makes us attractive targets for lobbying’ 
(Interview 12).  Access to information about trilogues was generally 
available through the return favour of providing value added analysis 
(Interview 51), and political and technical information, and where the CSO 
was going in the same direction of travel as the institutional actor in 
question (Interview 74).  The ability to acquire information quickly enough 
in order to make an intervention during the course of trilogues was seen 
as related to the ability to provide sufficient added value to a contact 
(Interview 51). 
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Dislike of trilogue un-transparency--There was a common dislike of the 
lack of transparency of trilogues and the need to obtain information about 
legislative progress through informal sources, indicating the limited extent 
to which these sources could deliver information in sufficient time to be 
able to follow the trilogue process in full in order to make interventions; if 
there is dissatisfaction about the supply of information, it indicates that 
organisations don’t have sufficient advantage to be able to keep it all to 
themselves. This across-the board dislike was also evident in the 
responses to the European Ombudsman’s public consultation on trilogues 
(European Ombudsman, 2016).   
 
CSOs as emissaries--Not infrequently, NGOs reported being agents 
of political communication between the institutions; for one NGO, ‘it 
happens all the time that we are political emissaries of the EP with the 
Council.  I was almost negotiating for the negotiator in one case’ 
(Interview 50).  Seen this way, civil society organisations which articulate 
public – and sometimes private – interests, can play a role in politicising 
issues in an otherwise closed policy-making system. Whilst CSOs can 
become drawn into the world of confidentiality in their quest for 
information, making it difficult for them to release information obtained in 
leaked documents, they can also stimulate public discussion of issues 
circulating in the ‘Brussels bubble’.  
 
Speed as important as secrecy--Even business organisations with 
extensive networks find it difficult to keep track of the pace of trilogue 
negotiations, particularly where these speed up towards the end of a file.  
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‘Too many, too quick’, and ‘we struggle to get the information’ at the late 
stages (Interview 77), explained one. For the public affairs consultancies, 
with their established networks, however, ‘we don’t lack access to 
information.  It’s not my view that the external interests say that they 
lack information’ (Interview 83). 
 
It is clear that information – the currency of power in Brussels – 
about trilogues is available to civil society organisations with an office in 
Brussels.  Nonetheless, complaints about the lack of transparency of 
trilogues indicate a limited abiity to make interventions.  Public affairs 
consultancies, with their extensive networks, seem to be most capable of 
acquiring information about the progress of trilogues, which is then 
passed on to a substantially business orientated clientele. For most civil 
society organisations, information becomes much more difficult to obtain 
the further down the pathway trilogues go, where EU institutions are 
intensively searching for consensus and external input becomes unhelpful.  
For some CSOs, information obtained during the trilogue process 
constrains their ability to policiticse issues, on the basis that it is 
privileged information (Interview 44). These factors lean towards the view 
of the EP as a ‘responsible’ legislator.  However, the ‘information for 
analysis’ thesis tends towards the view of the EP as a responsive 
legislator, sensitive to the information and perspectives which civil society 
organisations bring. Where civil society organisations are going in the 
same direction of travel as EU institutions, so they form a natural alliance, 
supporting the view of the Parliament as a responsive legislator, where 
information flows freely between the parties.  NGOs are more likely to 
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perform this role where EU institutions seek more stringent regulation, but 
business organisations too can have their own reasons for seeking more 
stringent regulation.  Civil society organisations can then perform a role in 
lobbying the Council, and, occasionally, vice-versa, as foreseen in 
institutionalist accounts of the policy process. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, we have traced how trilogues have become a politicised law 
making institution, and shown how the European Parliament has become 
the main driver of this process, primarily through reliance upon a wide 
range of civil society organisations, and particularly non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).  This has been our main contribution, providing 
empirical data which is otherwise scarce to find on the role of civil society 
organisations with trilogues, their relationships with EU institutions in the 
process, and whether there are any systematic biases in these 
relationships.  The European Parliament is able to assert itself viz. the 
Council of Ministers by using the ‘noisy politics’ of NGOs, and a wide range 
of NGOs are represented through the pluralisation of political parties in 
the EP in the trilogue process, such as the Greens or radical left parties. 
Flows of information continue between EU lawmakers and organised 
interests during the pivotal trilogue process.  Following the premises of 
politicisation, we show how civil society organisations have brought a 
growing salience to European governance, and an expansion of actors 
engaged in monitoring EU affairs.  Trilogues themselves, by nature, lend 
themselves to politicisation, as an unstable and dynamic institution.  The 
European Parliament is the most sensitive to the implications of trilogues 
Forthcoming in Politics & Governance, volume 7 issue 3 
 
24 
 
for democratic legitimacy, given its role as the people’s tribune, and 
therefore a driving force in the politicization of trilogues.  
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All interviews conducted in Brussels, unless otherwise indicated. 
Interview numbers reflect the assigned numbers from our interview 
database. 
Interview 84with Mr Emilio De Capitani, 23.01.2019.  Mr De Capitani 
was happy to be quoted and attributed. 
Interview 60 with a national trade union, 6.12.2017. 
Interview 37 with an MEP Assistant, 13.2.2018. 
Interview 63 with a producer association, 12.1.2018. 
Interview 44 with an NGO, 25.9.2017. 
Interview 43 with an NGO, 25.9.2017. 
Interview 12 with a Permanent Representation (PERMREP) of a member 
state, 16.1.2018. 
Interview 70 with a producer association, 6.6.2018. 
Interview 68 with a producer association, 5.4.2018. 
Interview 44 with an NGO, 25.9.2017. 
Interview 12 with a producer association, 7.6.2018. 
Interview 51 with an NGO, 6.10.2017. 
Interview 74 with a producer association, 7.6.2018. 
Interview 51 with and NGO, 6.10.2017. 
Interview 50 with an NGO, 29.9.2017. 
Interview 77 with a producer association, 8.6.2018 
Interview 83 with a Public Affairs consultancy, 6.6.2018 
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Table 1: Interviewees 
 
Trilogue insiders Trilogue outsiders 
Permanent Representations 
Large countries  
Medium countries 
Small countries 
12 
2 
7 
3 
Civil Society 
Organisations* 
NGOs 
Trade Unions 
Producer Associations 
38 
 
16 (15) 
2 (1) 
20 (19) 
European Parliament: 
MEPs (5 parties, 7 
committees) 
Party Advisors (same 
affiliations as MEPs) 
Assistants to MEPs 
 
30 
13 
11 
4 
2 
 
Other 
Public Affairs 
Consultancies 
European Ombudsman’s 
office 
Territorial governmental 
representative 
organisation 
Mr Emilio De Capitani 
6 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
Total 42  45 
* In parenthesis: figure of Civil Society Organizations at EU level.   
 
